Lost your sign-in method. What should happen next?
Secure recovery without weakening identity protection. Review passwordless methods, SSPR, risk policy and session containment, then resolve two original Northstar incidents.
Two original Northstar Services incidents: safe passwordless recovery after a lost factor and a combined risky-user/service-principal alert. Correct decisions advance the ticket.
Northstar's new employee lost their enrolled Authenticator phone before completing a phishing-resistant passkey setup. The help desk must validate identity, restore method registration and preserve access controls.
STEP 1 OF 4
The caller claims to be the new hire. What's the first approved action?
SC-300 / INCIDENT WORKBENCH / SEC-936
Identity Risk Containment & Recovery
Investigate the original Northstar alert, apply least-disruptive but effective containment, prove unauthorized access is denied, and restore legitimate access with an auditable trail.
Fictional sign-ins and sessions · No Microsoft tenant or production data · Existing Practice 015 progress is unchanged
01
Investigate before assigning a disposition
Risk data is a signal, not a conclusion. Correlate sources and verify the user's account of the activity through a trusted channel.
ENTRA / SIGN-IN LOG
02:18 UTC · Finance app · unfamiliar device and IP · high sign-in risk · suspicious authentication sequence
USER / TRUSTED CALLBACK
Employee confirms they were asleep and did not recognize this sign-in.
DEFENDER / INCIDENT
Correlated mailbox-rule change and elevated user-risk signal; investigate for downstream access.
SESSION INVENTORY
Active Entra refresh session plus a third-party SaaS cookie whose lifetime is controlled by that SaaS.
Stage: TRIAGE
02
Contain the confirmed compromise
Set response controls, confirm the compromise, then validate that attacker sessions cannot continue. A risk label does not independently revoke access.
03
Collect positive and negative tests
Test the attack paths while contained, then release the identity and confirm the approved employee and audit trail. Run the SaaS check explicitly: Entra session revocation isn't universal SaaS logout.
Unrecognized sign-in blocked
Attacker attempts another Entra authentication.
Available during contained stage
Existing refresh session revoked
Previously issued refresh session attempts to renew access.